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Sustainable industrialisation has practically evaded Nigeria, the 
efforts towards that direction notwithstanding. There are obvious 
policies and programmes designed to encourage industrial-based 
economy in the country. Of course, if achieved, industrialisation 
would ensure diversification and the country could save itself from 
the stranglehold of economic monoculturism. Nonetheless, “oil 
money” appears to be a cog in the wheel of progress in that direction 
(in essence, the direction of economic diversification). Basically, a 
country would not be able to achieve industrialisation and economic 
diversification when the state craft is repeatedly piloted by leaders 
with monocultural mentality. A lot of literature may exist on the 
failures and inadequacies of Nigerian leaders as the cause of the 
country’s economic backwardness. Nonetheless, it appears that the 
searchlight has not been adequately beamed on the monocultural 
attitude and mentality of those who constitute the leaders over the 
years. As would be shown in this paper, the monocultural attitude of 
the leaders has a ripple effect on the economic milieu of the country. 
Considering this gap, this paper employs the eclectic method of 
analysis to examine the leadership factors which have been 
militating against economic policy implementation in a rather 
promising economy. The paper explicates the nature of Nigerian 
economy, showing its potentials and investigating on the factors 
impeding the identified potentials. 
 
Introduction 
Nigeria is regarded as one of the largest economies in Africa. 
However, the country is a monoculture economy, especially since 
the discovery of crude petroleum, first in Olobiri, a community 
located in the present day Bayelsa State, in the late 1950s and the 
subsequent exploration of the resource in commercial quantity. The 
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discovery of petroleum in an age when industrialisation was 
basically powered by the resource appeared to be an obvious 
blessing. Therefore, it was expected that the leaders of Nigeria, at 
the time when crude oil was explored in commercial quantity, take 
advantage of the huge revenue accruable from the exportation of the 
resource to put the country’s economy on the part of sustainable 
development through diversification. Unfortunately, empirical 
observations have shown that numerous factors have kept the 
country from achieving the desired economic diversification. One of 
such factors is lack of innovative approach in economic policy 
making. In essence, the leaders have a monoculture approach to 
economic policies and programmes.  
The monoculture trait of Nigerian leaders reflects on their 
attitude towards any sector of the economy that was not petroleum. 
There have been numerous efforts to improve agriculture, industry 
and trade in non-petroleum goods as could be seen in this paper. 
There are equally cases of efforts to increase non-petroleum exports. 
These efforts are shown in the attractive government economic 
policies and programmes. Unfortunately, these policies and 
programmes mostly lacked the will power to implement them. This 
lack of will power can be blamed on the huge oil revenue that 
basically corrupted the mind of the leaders. What is more, the 
leaders have mostly shown to lack patriotism, which is a primary 
prerequisite for progressive and selfless leadership. All these come 
together to shape the monoculture attitude of Nigerian leaders over 
the years. This study delves into explicating how the monoculture 
attitude of the Nigerian leaders has perpetrated a monoculture 
economy that made the country a crippled giant.    
 
The Emergence of Crude Oil Economy and the Decline of 
Agriculture   
Before oil took the centre stage of the Nigerian economy, the 
country had depended on agricultural production for its major 
exports. By 1958, agriculture contributed 68% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the country. (Lawal, 1997) However, agricultural 
productivity consistently declined since 1970. 
Generally, the popular agricultural export produce from 
Nigeria, especially before independence, were palm produce, 
groundnuts and cotton (Udo and Falola, 2010). Nonetheless, there 
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were a plethora of agricultural produce that had appreciable export 
value apart from those mentioned above. Each region of the country 
is known to specialise in specific products, basically because of the 
climatic conditions inherent which allows for such production. In the 
north, peasant farmers produced cereals, sorghum, rice, groundnuts, 
cotton, millet and some wheat. On its own side, the south is known 
to have specialised in root and tree crops like yam, cassava, citrus 
fruits, palm produce, kolanuts, cocoa and rubber. According to A.A. 
Lawal (1997), despite their reliance on traditional methods of 
shifting cultivation and the use of traditional implements, peasant 
farmers produced 70% of Nigeria’s exports and 95% of food 
requirements. Considering the statement credited to Lawal, Nigeria 
had overtly relied on crude farming methods, which involved the use 
of non-mechanised tools and implements. This was an early sign of 
monoculturism that may have discouraged the agrarian economy, in 
furtherance serving as a foundation for its abandonment at the wake 
of petroleum oil exploration. Had the leadership of the country 
extricated itself from the monoculture mentality in the economic 
sphere of the country, maybe method of cultivation and agricultural 
productivity may have been improved in line with modern methods 
and the overt reliance on the crude oil at the dawn of commercial oil 
exploration may not have happened. 
A major nail on the coffin of agricultural production in 
Nigeria and in furtherance, economic diversification, was the rise in 
oil price in the 1970s. The event of rise in oil price precipitated high 
revenue for the country through petroleum oil exportation. The 
country became so wealthy that General Yakubu Gowon, who was 
Nigeria’s military head of states in the early 1970s, reportedly 
declared that Nigeria had so much money that it did not know how 
to spend (Nwankwo, 1999). The statement credited to Gowon may 
have explained why his government failed to adequately invest on, 
and implement some of the agricultural programmes of his regime 
with the huge oil revenue accruable to the coffers of the country. 
This was another clear case of impaired leadership. Instead of 
looking inwards to diversify the economy through mechanisation of 
agriculture, the Nigerian government at the time took up the stance 
of “father Christmas” for its West African neighbours. Even the 
Gowon’s Second National Development Plan appears to have 
neglected agriculture because it was not found as one of the main 
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objectives of the Plan (Ojiakor, 2014). The long term effect of this 
neglect was the establishment of an economy that depended on 
petroleum products and aids from donor actors in the international 
system. Of course there were efforts by subsequent governments to 
reawaken the agricultural sector of the economy, but these efforts 
had traces of monoculture attitude which impaired their 
implementation. 
 
Monoculture, Leadership and Impaired Industrialisation in 
Nigeria 
The Nigerian practice of monocultural economy does not only affect 
the agricultural sector, but also rubs off negatively on the industrial 
sector of the nation’s economy. A passive observation of Nigerian 
economy may indicate a total dearth and neglect of the industrial 
sector by the government. Even though successive governments 
appear to have been prioritising industrialisation in their economic 
policy objectives, their implementations have left much to be 
desired.  
However, the neglect of industry or the manufacturing sector 
of the Nigerian economy does not have a historical antecedent 
beyond the colonial times. Before and during colonialism, different 
areas of Nigeria evolved elaborate indigenous manufacturing sector 
as could be allowed and supported by their prevailing environmental 
exigencies. The environment as a factor in the nature of industry that 
flourished in a given part of the country before the contemporary 
times is explained by Olufemi Ekundare (1973) in the following 
words: 
Natural and geographical factors dictated the 
location of industries in Nigeria. The canoe industry 
developed along the coastal areas and the river 
banks...cotton had been grown and manufactured 
into cloth for many centuries past. Spun, hand-
woven in simple cloth and dyed with colours 
obtained from native plants, it provided most of the 
clothing of the people. Nearly all the ginning, 
spinning and weaving equipment was made of 
wood. There were two types of loom. The one used 
by men was a narrow upright type worked with 
pedals, and was commonly adopted all over 
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Northern Nigeria... Long before the nineteenth 
century, the people of Nigeria had been mining iron, 
tin, gold, salt and other minerals. Ironworks existed 
in many areas, including Ijebu-Ode, Ilorin, Bida and 
Awka. 
 
Apart from explicating the environmental factor in manufacturing, 
Ekundare (1973) goes on to provide an insight on the industrial 
sector of the pre-colonial and pre-independence Nigerian economy. 
Unfortunately, the elaborate industrial foundation laid over the 
years, which depicts the independent ingenuity of the Nigerian 
indigenous manufacturers, was laid for sacrifice on the altar of crude 
petroleum.  Of course, many scholars believe that the neglect in the 
post-independence industrial sector was precipitated by the colonial 
deliberate efforts to ensure the de-industrialisation of the country. In 
as much as this assertion remains valid, the country obviously had 
the opportunity to effect sustainable industrialisation with the 
revenue from petroleum during the days of oil boom, but the 
investment on industrialisation by the successive governments 
appeared to have yielded minimal results and the attitude of 
governmental officials shows a people who have been overwhelmed 
by the oil revenue that other aspects of the country’s industry 
remained neglected. The situation provided the foundation for the 
dependency on aid and international donors and an insight on the 
monoculture attitude of Nigerian leaders. 
Of course, as inferred in the previous paragraph, there were 
visible attempts made by successive governments to achieve 
industrialisation in Nigeria. Evidence shows that revenue from 
petroleum exports had over the years been channeled towards 
industrial development but, as would be shown in this section, 
obvious cases of corruption, ineptitude, incompetence, nepotism and 
gross mismanagement, among other maladies, have affected the 
productivity of the efforts towards industrialisation. The attention 
given to industrialisation in the post-colonial Nigeria could be 
gleaned through the words of Onwuka Njoku (2014) which goes as 
follows: 
The immediate post-colonial government’s dream of 
industrializing the economy was supported with a 
package of facilitative measures and incentives 
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designed to create a favorable investment climate in 
the country. These involved legislative enactments, 
institutional reforms and infrastructural 
improvements. Nigeria’s industrial potentials were 
also advertised overseas in order to woo foreign 
investors. At home, various laws were passed which 
gave, some critics have argued, “over-generous tax 
reliefs” to foreign investors and allowed them to 
repatriate their profits and even capital almost at 
will. 
 
Also, the industrialisation of the economy became one of the key 
objectives of the First National Development Plan, 1962-1968. In 
that development plan, government planned investment on 
manufacturing was 13.4 percent of total spending. The Second 
National Development Plan, 1970-1974 also attempted to promote 
industrialisation by rectifying the lopsided distribution and location 
of industries. Furthermore, A.A. Lawal (1997) notes that the 
consistent support of government for further industrialisation in the 
Third National Development Plan between the 1970s and 1980s 
stimulated rapid growth and investment in output, employment and a 
number of industrial plants which concentrated on production of 
light consumer goods like cotton, textile, beer, cement and paints. 
There were also some other immediate gains accrued from the 
industrial or manufacturing sector with the implementation of some 
of the measures that were adopted to boost the sector. Contributions 
of the sector to the growth of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) experienced steady growth, especially up to 1983. According 
to statistics, the sector contributed 4 percent of the country’s GDP in 
1958-1959; 6 percent in 1963-1964; 9 percent in 1969-1969; 16 
percent in 1982; 18.2 percent in 1983; 7.4 percent in 1993; and 6.9 
percent in 1994 and the percentage kept dwindling up to the close of 
the 20th century (Njoku, 2014). It is significant to note that the 
contributions of the industrial sector began to nosedive by 1993, and 
the year falls within the scope of this study. Events show that the 
period marked the peak of political instability in the country, 
precipitated by military coup d’état and the concomitant truncation 
of existing economic programmes.    
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The last sentence of the indented quotation above, as 
credited to Njoku, underscores another force that bedevils the 
Nigerian economy. That force is overt dependence on foreign 
investment, which is considered by dependency theorists as a factor 
of neo-colonialism. Foreign investment is a basic ingredient of 
economic growth in the world of free trade. However, Nigeria 
appears to lack the bargaining power to influence the terms of trade 
to its favour.  
The failure to develop the manufacturing or industrial sector 
of the Nigerian economy is exemplified in the gloom that befell the 
attempt to establish a sustainable steel industry in the country. This 
situation is succinctly captured by Njoku (2014) in the following 
words, “The story of the Ajaokuta Steel Company exemplifies most 
of the indices of Nigeria’s industrial calamity...” The Ajaokuta steel 
complex has turned out to be a monument reminding the nation of its 
failure in the industrial sector and the wastefulness of 
monoculturism. Of course, the government had a juicy plan towards 
the project, considering the place of steel in industrial development. 
It was made clear that the benefits of a steel industry would include 
the provision of materials for a wide range of industrial and 
construction works. This would go further to ensure local content in 
manufacturing and also help to achieve import substitution, thereby 
promising favourable balance of payment. In examining the idea of 
developing a steel industry in Nigeria and the construction of the 
Ajaokuta steel complex, it is important to note that some European 
firms contracted in 1958 to study the feasibility of a viable steel 
industry in Nigeria returned a negative verdict. One sticking point 
was the quality of Nigerian coal and iron ore. However, a Russian 
firm was subsequently contracted for same feasibility study and their 
verdict was positive. According to Njoku (2014), the Russian firm 
may have told the Nigerian government what it preferred to hear. 
With the Russian firm beaming a green light on the viability of steel 
industry in Nigeria, the Second Republic administration of Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari set out in earnest to make the development of iron 
and steel a priority in the country’s industrial sector. To achieve this 
objective, the Shagari administration went on to set up a Steel 
Development Department, with a minister of cabinet rank to oversee 
it. In fact, to show the place of iron and steel in the order of 
economic development priority of the Second Republic, the 
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government did not just initiate the construction of the gigantic 
Ajaokuta steel complex, it went on to commence the construction of 
four more steel plants. These plants included the Delta Direct 
Reduction Complex Aladja near Warri, and the Inland Rolling Mills 
at Oshogbo, Jos and Katsina. However, the Ajaokuta steel plant was 
the most expensive, thereby easily drawing the attention of anyone 
studying the industrial sector of Nigeria. The Russian firm, by the 
name, Tiajprom Export took up the contract of constructing the plant 
on 13th July, 1979. The plant was designed to have the initial 
production capacity of 1.3 million tonnes of steel per annum, rising 
to 2.6 million tonnes in the second phase and to 5.2 million in the 
third and final phase. The government went on to award contracts 
which were said to be up to N830 million for civil works and 
townships in the Ajaokuta steel complex. The manpower 
requirements of the operation of the plant was estimated at 9,000. 
(Ojiakor, 2014) Unfortunately, the Ajaokuta steel complex could not 
be completed and steel production in appreciable commercial scale 
has not been achieved in the country. With the absence of steel 
exports, Nigeria continues to rely heavily on the petroleum oil 
exports and revenue.   
 
A Compromised Trade Sector as an Indication of Monoculture 
Economy  
The developments in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the 
Nigerian economy have a direct influence on the trade or 
commercial sector, especially on exports. This is because a country 
can only trade with other countries that which it has comparative 
advantage of producing agriculturally or industrially. It is worthy to 
note here that different parts of the country evolved different trade 
patterns in the pre-colonial times and many of them were involved in 
significant exports or what was termed long distant trade mostly 
across the Sahara. North Africa is known as the sub-region to 
establish the first regular contact with Nigeria. This was made 
possible by the trans-Saharan trade. Ekundare (1973) throw light on 
the historical significance of the trans-Saharan trade on Nigeria and 
the West African sub-region when he states thus, “By the use of 
camels, caravan trade routes were developed across the Sahara 
between West and North Africa, and for a long period these routes 
were the only ways to and from West Africa and the outside world.” 
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However, colonialism redirected Nigeria’s foreign trade from across 
the Sahara to Europe. The primary motive of the British in Nigeria 
was to establish the colony as a base for industrial primary products 
and also as a market for British manufactured goods. This objective 
directed the British colonial economic policies in the country. The 
British intensified the exportation of raw materials from Nigeria and 
export figures soared high especially in the southern part of the 
country. The years between 1908 and 1910 experienced rapid 
growth in Nigeria’s external trade in the southern parts. A similar 
phenomenal growth was experienced in the northern Nigeria area 
from 1910 onwards. The increase in exports was made possible by 
the colonial infrastructural policy. There was the impressive network 
of railways across the country, and the northern contributions on 
trade were effectively made possible by the extension of the railway 
from Minna to Kano in 1911. These contributions could be seen in 
the statistics of groundnut exports from the region. Whereas 
groundnut exports from the north was about 1,179 tons in 1910, it 
reached 19,288 in 1911. (Uhomoibhi, Mahadi, and Anyanwu, 2010) 
By the time Nigeria gained independence in 1960, it started 
experiencing trade deficits. This could be attributed to the deliberate 
colonial effort to de-industrialise the country. Therefore, at 
independence, instead of Nigeria depending on local production for 
export, it engaged in large scale importation of machinery and 
equipments. Nonetheless, the country soon started experiencing 
trade surpluses as a result of massive exports of crude oil. However, 
the positive outcome of the export of crude only reinforced the 
country’s dependence on foreign capital goods and industrial raw 
materials, thereby precipitating long-term negative impact. Trade 
deficits returned beginning in mid-1970. Since then Nigeria's 
balance of trade has alternated between periods of deficits and of 
surpluses, driven by fluctuations in the global oil market and 
government decisions on how to spend its money. A trade surplus in 
1980, for example, allowed work to continue on the new federal 
capital designate of Abuja, but by 1982 the surplus had become a 
deficit, and at the end of 1983 the country was virtually bankrupt. At 
the beginning of the 21st century, exports were greater than imports, 
but the interest on the country's external debt was so high that a truly 
favourable balance of trade (as opposed to one that existed on paper 
only) hinged at least partly on the effectiveness of debt relief.(Udo 
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and Falola, 2010) This highly unstable situation perpetuate the 
country’s dependency on international donors and further highlights 
the incompetence of the leaders, who have imbibed a monocultural 
attitude towards the country’s economy. 
There has always been an effective and elaborate internal 
trading system in Nigeria over the years. The direction of domestic 
trade in staple foods is largely north-south between different 
ecological zones but also between major urban centres in the 
southeast and southwest. The southern states supply plantains, 
cassava, kola nuts, and fruit to the northern states, which in turn 
supply beans, onions, and livestock to the southern states. Yams 
from the central region are traded in the southern and the far 
northern cities. Women play a dominant role in marketing foodstuffs 
and manufactured goods in the southern states. Most of the food 
items and manufactured goods are sold in open market stalls, in 
small neighbourhood shops, and on the streets. Normally, the 
internal trading system could have helped to ensure sustainable 
markets for domestically produced goods hence contributing 
enormously to economic development through equitable distribution 
of income per capita. Unfortunately, such factors as overdependence 
on oil, inflation and unhealthy competition with imported goods 
have kept on undermining local production and trading. 
 
An Untapped Service Sector 
A critical look at the service sector of the Nigerian economy will 
show that the sector is virtually untapped. Major components of the 
service sector, which are science and technology, are conspicuously 
absent in the country’s economic environment. Another highly 
rewarding component of the service sector, which is tourism, is 
virtually comatose in the country. Ironically, Nigeria has lots of 
tourism prospects because the country has many attractions of 
interest to tourists. There are miles of coastal beaches, wildlife 
reserves, a variety of cultures, and many museums that house artistic 
treasures. Obviously, the attention of the country’s leaders have not 
been drawn in those areas because they keep staring at the direction 
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Leadership of the Military and Further Economic Woes for 
Nigeria (Economic Policies of the Military Junta in the 1980s 
and 1990s) 
Nigerian economy in the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by a 
conspicuous monoculturism and romance with foreign donors. This 
basically came in form of concerted attempts to ameliorate the long 
ailing economy. However, some unfortunate developments in the 
country strained the economic relations between Nigeria and many 
western donor actors, thereby deepening the economic woes of the 
country. Such unfortunate developments were the ugly human rights 
situation precipitated by military dictatorships in the country. The 
General Sani Abacha’s military junta particularly witnessed 
sanctions from international state and non-state actors, including 
prospective donor agencies, because of records of blatant human 
rights violations attributed to the regime. These sanctions went 
further to stultify oil exports and sales for the country.  
The Nigerian story of economic woes, precipitated by 
unsound economic leadership in the second half of the 1980s up till 
the first quarter of the 1990s could be told within the context of the 
country’s relations with the Bretton Woods institutions. With the oil 
glut that graced the Nigerian economy at the turn of the 1980s, the 
country was faced by the maladies that came with a monoculture 
economy, which relies on crude oil exportation. The situation is 
explicated by A. C. Agajelu, N. J. Obiakor and Leo Nnoli (2016) in 
the following words: 
By the late 1970s and the turn of the 1980s, the 
global oil price experienced a drastic fall which 
resulted to the oil glut. Nigeria started experiencing 
excruciating balance of payments deficits due to 
sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings. The 
monoculture economy of the country that deepened 
since the exploration of petroleum in commercial 
quantity only served to worsen the fall of the 
national income. The country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) started experiencing a steady 
decline. The economy of the country dipped to an 
all-time low and the policy makers seemed totally 
clueless as to measures which will save the 
drowning economy. The Bretton Woods Institutions 
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seemed to be the only light at the end of the tunnel 
especially as credit facilities was no longer flowing 
in from international commercial banks. 
 
Of course the Nigerian economy experienced a major hiccup as the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings could not take care of its import 
bills. During the oil boom, Nigeria was known to have engaged in 
heavy importation of both capital and consumer goods. This reliance 
on importations made the governments of the country scamper for 
donorship since the income of the country could no longer balance 
with its expenditure. However, at this point it is pertinent to show 
with statistics the period when the external sector of the country’s 
economy enjoyed a favourable balance of payment. This period is 
regarded as the period of growth of Nigeria’s merchandise trade. The 
positive trend is explicated in the table below:  
 
Table 2.1 
The Growth of Nigeria’s Merchandise Trade, 1946-1974 
Year Exports (Naira 000) Import (Naira 000) 
1946 49,292 40,918 
1950 180,446 123,736 
1955 265,067 272,238 
1960 339,427 431,782 
1965 536,538 550,788 
1970 885,365 756,419 
1971 1,293,338 1,078,907 
1972 1,434,212 990,064 
1973 2,278,415 1,224,786 
1974 5,794,837 1,737,324 
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Trade Report, Annual Abstract 
of Statistics and Economic Indicators; Quoted in Fajana et al, (1979) 
 
Even though naira was not in use in the earlier period before 1970, 
as presented in the table 2.1, the value of imports and exports are 
given in naira to achieve uniformity. The table shows the advantage 
exports had over imports and the positive trend of balance of 
payment accruable. Imports only edged over exports in 1960, which 
was the independence year and 1965, which was a year that marked 
Agajelu & Orizu: Monoculturalism in Nigeria… 
85 
 
the height of instability that characterised Nigeria’s first republic. 
After these periods, the index became positive again. Of course, we 
know these years as seen in the table as the years Nigeria achieved 
its best economic results. The table 2.2 below justifies this assertion. 
The economic realities that led to the country’s reliance on oil 




Selected Indicators of Economic Growth Performance,  
1975- 1984 

























100.0 118.6 162.8 178.8 202.6 147.2 48.9 86.1 186.6 125.1 




100.0 138.5 155.0 118.4 222.7 296.4 234.1 175.1 157.8 193.8 
Source: Oyejide, Soyode and Kayode (1985) 
 
The table 2.2 above presents data on the indicators which capture the 
essential elements of Nigeria’s economic growth performance during 
the 1975-1984 decade. Three types of growth indicators are 
displayed in the table. The indicator of aggregate output 
performance is the average annual growth rate of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). According to the trend shown by this 
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indicator, the rapid inducing impact of the 1973-1974 sharp 
increases in crude oil prices carried through the first three years of 
the 1975-1984 periods. Positive and impressive GDP growth rates 
were thus recorded up to 1977; although the rate fell steadily during 
the three years from 10 percent in 1975 and 1976 down to under 7 
percent in 1977. Then, there was a sharp drop to a negative growth 
rate of -5.6 percent in 1978. Another sharp reversal occurred in 
1979, this time in the desirable upward direction. Unfortunately, this 
rally turned out to be short-lived; the growth rate took a nosedive 
shortly thereafter and it remained in the negative range through 
1984. Thus, the GDP has fallen consistently through the first half of 
the 1980s; and in practical terms, Nigerians have had to endure four 
consecutive years of generally declining standard of living. (Oyejide, 
Soyode and Kayode, 1985) 
The other two types of indicators as shown in the table 2.1 
go on to show the proximate causes of general decline in Nigeria’s 
living standard. Two indicators attempt to track the performance of 
domestic production for the local market. These are the indices of 
agricultural production and manufacturing output. The trend of 
agricultural output represents a clear disaster case. Over the 10year 
period, agricultural output remained more or less stagnant at a level 
which was well below (by roughly 10 percent) the 1975 
performance. Given Nigeria’s rapidly growing population, the 
consequences of a stagnant agriculture are obvious grim. The trend 
of manufacturing output, according to the table, is more reassuring. 
Steady, though not dramatic, increases in output are recorded 
throughout the 1975-1984 period, except in the last year when a 
fairly sharp drop is shown as the index declined from 307.4 to 251.4 
between 1983 and 1984, as shown in the table. This decrease of 
about 21 percent in manufacturing output was the ultimate reflection 
of the drastic shortage of industrial raw material inputs following 
tight control on imports which was progressively imposed from 
1982 as a means of dealing with the increasingly acute shortage of 
foreign exchange. (Oyejide, Soyode and Kayode, 1985) 
However, as indicated earlier in this paper, the proximate cause of 
the economic crises, which pushed Nigeria to be donor-dependent 
economy, are to be found in the external sector. Just as the oil 
(export) boom of the 1973-1975 period created the growth-inducing 
resources which enhanced GDP growth rate up to 1977, the impact 
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of subsequent events in the external sector is reflected in the GDP 
growth trend between 1978 and 1984. The external sector, as 
inferred earlier, has been dominated by oil export earnings. Foreign 
exchange earnings from the agricultural sector exhibited a mild 
upward trend until 1979, after which a marked decline occurred. 
This sector thus contributed somewhat to the economic crisis of the 
1980s. But the real culprit clearly appears to be the oil sector. As 
indicated in table 2.1, particular declines in the index of oil export 
earnings were faithfully reflected by corresponding decreases in the 
GDP growth rate. For instance, as the index dropped from 155.0 
to118.4 between 1977 and 1978, the GDP growth rate fell from 6.6 
percent to -5.6 percent. The consecutive year to year decreases of the 
index between 1980 and 1983 were mirrored by similar declining 
GDP growth rates over the period. As the index regained an upward 
trend between 1983 and 1984, the GDP growth rate also improved. 
(Oyejide, Soyode and Kayode, 1985) 
From the explications above, it has been shown that the 
policy-makers of Nigeria during the 1970s were either 
unknowledgeable of the linkage effect of international price of oil on 
the country’s GDP and in furtherance on the county’s economic 
growth and development, or they were simply ignorant of it. In all, 
the economic realities plunged the country down the dangerous lane 
of balance of payments deficits and its resultant economic recession. 
The situation made the country to look in the direction of major 
donors which were the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund) for bailout loans.  
By the turn of the 1980s, the second republic government of Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari was battling to revive a seriously ailing economy. 
Unfortunately, while efforts were made by the government to keep 
the country on the part of economic growth and development, other 
events in the international economic arena, especially the global 
economic recession, effectively weighed the country’s economy 
down. The recession worsened an already bad situation of decreased 
oil exports and precipitated a rapid decline in commodity prices on 
the world market. To meet external financial commitments Nigeria 
was increasingly forced to borrow money from international capital 
market. General mismanagement of available funds made the 
country to suffer mounting budget deficits which, according to T. 
Falolaet al (2010), rose from N3,295.6 million in 1980 to N4,882.6 
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million in 1981 and N5,373.1 million in 1982. Total government 
deficits increased from 16.6 percent in 1980 to 31.9 percent in 1982. 
The budgetary deficits were financed by borrowings and by 1983 
Nigeria had already developed a scary debt profile. 
In addition to going to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Shagari’s 
government also made some indigenous efforts to salvage the 
country’s economy.  In order to battle the downward sliding 
economy, the government promulgated the Economic Stabilisation 
(Temporary Provision) Act of 1982. This Act was promulgated 
primarily to reduce government expenditures and curtail imports. 
The president justified the Act by stating that “since government 
depended on oil revenue for 82% of its expenditure; the decline of 
oil sector has had various impacts on our domestic finance.” 
(Agajelu, Obiakor and Leo Nnoli, 2016) In order to check 
importations the government went on to impose import duties where 
hitherto non-existent, increase the existing import duties and import 
licenses already issued to various categories of business persons 
were recalled for review. In addition, business travel allowances 
were cut from N2,500 and compulsory advanced deposits imposed 
on importers of certain commodities including food, building 
materials, raw materials for use in industry, spare parts and so on. 
Furthermore, external borrowing by states was restricted. 
These economic measures became known as austerity measure. 
While the aforementioned internal austerity measures were being 
adopted, negotiations were started with the IMF for a loan. The 
negotiations with the IMF for a loan could not be completed by the 
Shagari administration as it was forcefully replaced by the military 
junta led by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. 
The Buhari’s military government began renegotiation of 
loan agreements between the country and the IMF. Nonetheless, the 
government appeared to be indecisive on whether to accept the IMF 
conditionality and go for the loan or whether to reject the loan 
because of what was regarded as the IMF draconian conditionality. 
This indecision is seen as one of the economic short-comings of the 
Gen. Buhari military administration. Falola et al (2010) capture the 
situation in the following words: 
Perhaps the most serious weakness of the economic 
programme of the Buhari administration was its 
failure to evolve any overall strategy for dealing 
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with Nigeria’s external indebtedness which at the 
time peaked at 20 billion dollars. Faced with an 
option of taking an additional loan with assorted 
conditions from the International Monetary Fund, 
and a rejection of the loans with self-imposed 
economic policies which would radically depart 
from the existing policies, the Buhari administration 
simply prevaricated. 
 
 The military junta of Buhari was toppled in 1985 to be replaced by 
another junta led by Gen. Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, popularly 
known as IBB. The IBB administration immediately made known its 
commitment to tackle the economic difficulties which faced the 
country and therefore, did not hesitate to open up for loan 
negotiations with the IMF. Agajelu, Obiakor and Nnoli (2016) 
describe the changes the IBB government introduced to the Nigerian 
economy in the following words: 
However, the coming to power of General Ibrahim 
Babangida marked a turning in the annals of 
economic restructuring in Nigeria. In its efforts to 
break the icy relationship between Nigeria and the 
IMF, the regime instituted a national debate on the 
desirability of Nigeria obtaining a 2.5billion U.S 
dollar loan with the accompanying conditionality. It 
was reported that though the delegates rejected the 
loan during the national debate, Babangida went 
ahead and implemented the Structural Adjustment 
Programme which was the conditionality for 
procurement of the IMF loan. 
 
Even though there was what appeared to be unpopular response to 
the IBB’s desire to accept the IMF loan under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), the government went ahead to adopt 
and launch SAP in June 1986. The adoption of SAP and the obvious 
hardship that came with the programme strengthened the voice of 
proponents of dependency theory. The conditionality of SAP has 
been described as draconian and has been deeply criticised both 
within and outside Nigeria. In the context of the IMF, conditionality 
refers to the policies a member is expected to follow in order to 
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secure access to the resources of the Fund, in essence to the 
conditions that have to be met for gaining access to the financial 
resources of the Fund. These policies are intended to help ensure that 
the member country will overcome its external payments problem 
and thus be in a position to repay the Fund in a timely manner. The 
policies towards economic reforms as contained in SAP as at the 
1980s included: 
 Import substitution 
 Privatisation and commercialisation 
 Trade liberalisation 
 Withdrawal of subsidies 
 Currency devaluation (Edwards, 1989) 
      The IBB’s administration of proposed certain objectives for the 
implementation of SAP. These objectives are documented by 
Falola et al (2010) as thus: 
 To restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy 
in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports; 
 To achieve fiscal balance of payments viability, that is to say, 
reduction and, possibly total elimination of budget deficits; 
 To lay the grounds for a sustainable non-inflationary or minimal 
inflationary growth; 
 To lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the 
public sector, and improve the sector’s efficiency as well as 
intensify the growth potential of the private sector; and  
 To reduce the strangulating regime of administrative controls in 
the economic sector of national life. 
 
The effects of SAP on the Nigerian economy have been a subject of 
intensive debate among both economists and lay people. However, 
its direct impact on the citizenry, which came in form of low living 
conditions attributed to the devaluation of the naira, inflation, 
removal of subsides, among others, made the programme a subject 
of intense criticism.  
By 1991, the economy of Nigeria was characterised by the 
effects of structural adjustment. The government claimed that 
deregulation would boost domestic productivity thereby diversifying 
the economy. It was particularly expected that agricultural 
production would experience a boost. However, there are indications 
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that the agricultural sector generally remained sluggish even though 
official statistics suggest an absolute increase in the output of 
commodities like cotton and cocoa. Devaluation of the naira meant 
increased cost for farming communities, both of farming inputs and 
consumer goods. More significantly, the removal of subsidy on 
fertilisers, seeds, farm equipment and pesticides added to the 
increased costs suffered by farmers by the 1990s. Furthermore, the 
middlemen took advantage of the removal of the marketing boards 
to impose their will on the countryside to the detriment of the 
peasantry. 
The industrial sector was particularly hit hard by the 
structural adjustment, especially by 1991. There was diminished 
industrial capacity utilisation due to the devaluation of the naira and 
the resultant inflation. Akin Fadahunsi et al (1996) reports that the 
industrial sector was so badly affected by the adjustment programme 
to the point that capacity utilisation in several cases fell below their 
pre-adjustment levels. The situation was exacerbated by trade 
liberalisation which made Nigeria a dumping ground for foreign 
producers. Furthermore, the collapse of consumer purchasing power 
meant an increase in unsold stocks in manufacturers’ warehouses. 
The resultant effect of this was large-scale factory closures across 
Nigeria in the 1990s. 
Some argue that the boom in the banking and financial 
sector witnessed since 1986 was a positive effect of SAP due to 
deregulation. However, Fadahunsi et al (1996) argue that this boom 
only heightened speculative activities, especially with regard to naira 
exchange rate. They went further to state that in the period up to 5 
March 1992, bankers, especially merchant bankers, were able to earn 
a rent of up to N8 on the dollar by trading dollars (and other hard 
currencies) which they bought from the Central Bank of Nigeria at 
about N10 to the dollar for between N15-N18 to the dollar. The 
bureau de change which they set up also prospered on such huge 
rents. The decision of the CBN to devalue on 5 March 1992 and 
become an active trader in the foreign exchange market failed 
significantly to put a decisive end to this kind of rent-seeking. 
Indeed, a new gap opened almost immediately between 
commercial/central bank naira exchange rate and the parallel market 
bureau de change rates. As of the end of December 1993, whereas 
the central bank rate for one US dollar was N21.9, the parallel 
 Ogirisi: a new journal of African studies vol. 15s 2019 
92 
 
market/bureau de change rate was N47. In 1995, while the CBN rate 
stood at N22 to the dollar, the parallel market rate rose as high as 
N82 to one dollar. This trend marked the instability which hit the 
banking and financial sector of the economy in the 1990s as a result 
of the SAP. In all, SAP failed to be an agent of the highly needed 
economic diversification. Instead it perpetuated the country’s 
dependency on foreign donors and the rot in the economy continued 
ever since. 
The return to civilian government promised some new 
dimensions in solving the Nigerian economic problems. While the 
military dictatorships were characterised by authoritarianism which 
manifested in uncontested decrees, the civilian government had the 
promise of incorporating experts and technocrats to help solve the 
country’s economic malady. By the time the Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s administration emerged in 1999, there appeared to be a 
light at the end of the long dark tunnel. Taking cognizance of the 
deplorable living conditions of Nigerians and the negative effects of 
SAP on the industrial sector of the economy, Obasanjo stated the 
following as top of his economic policy objectives: 
 Emphasis on developing manufacturing industries as opposed to 
agriculture, 
 Movement of labour from rural to urban industrial areas,  
 Less reliance on imported goods in preference to home produced 
goods, 
 Revision or abolition of the outdated land tenure system that 
hindered the acquisition of land for industrial projects, and 
 Establishment of a stable political system. (Ojiakor, 2014) 
 
Conclusion 
In as much as Obasanjo’s efforts achieved varied results, the 
monoculture economy trend, which continually hinder Nigeria’s 
bargaining power in a free trade international economic system, 
persisted. Subsequent governments of Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’dua, 
Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari (who was the 
Nigeria’s president in 2017) attempted to adopt different measure to 
make a difference in the Nigerian economy and ensure positive 
balance of payments. However, the fall in the global oil price in 
2015 and the concomitant economic recession that hit Nigerian 
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economy shows that much progress has not been made in the area of 
economic diversification.    
We have identified certain factors that undermine Nigerian 
economy and such factors are the unhealthy monoculture economy 
system, political instability, inflation, heavy importation of capital 
and non-capital goods and so on. The question now becomes: what 
are the trends in the Nigerian environment that precipitated these 
factors? Empirical observation shows that the unhealthy trends that 
keep the country economically crippled among other things include, 
corruption, maladministration, misplaced priorities, nepotism, 
despotism, disintegration, and unpatriotic overtures. From the first 
republic, each administration in Nigeria had been characterised by 
the above mentioned anti-nation building traits. This made Chinua 
Achebe (1983) to write thus: 
The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a 
failure of leadership. There is nothing basically 
wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing 
wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or 
air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the 
unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the 
responsibility, to the challenge of personal example 
which are the hallmarks of true leadership. 
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